In 2000 Florentino Perez became president of Real Madrid. His success was based predominantly on the promise of signing Luis Figo, simultaneously impressing supporters and embarrassing perennial rivals, Barcelona. Each summer another mammoth transfer fee would see another superstar arrive. The Galacticos era had begun. However, as Perez’s single-mindedness got the better of him and Madrid’s success started to dry up, the club lost sight of their original plan amid the glamour of their globetrotting fantasy team. The Zidanes and Pavons strategy ultimately failed but was the central idea a worthwhile one?

“Why put another layer of gold paint on the Bentley if you are losing the entire engine?” It’s 2003, Claude Makelele has been allowed to leave the Spanish capital for Chelsea and Zinedine Zidane is not happy. Zizou had been the second of Florentino Perez’s Galactico signings in 2001 a year on from Luis Figo, followed by Ronaldo the next summer and David Beckham, who arrived as Makelele departed in 2003. As he proved in London, Makelele would turn out to be just as crucial as Zidane indicted, forming the base of Jose Mourinho’s title winning midfield, quietly allowing his team to run smoothly around him for the next five seasons as Chelsea won a pair of Premier League trophies. His absence was keenly felt at the Bernabeu, after winning their ninth European title in 2002 and the La Liga crown in 03, Real went 4 years without a major honour. Perez’s naive attitude towards defensive, pragmatic players developed into an alarming tactical vulnerability.

Originally, Perez famously looked to instigate a policy labelled “Zidanes y Pavones”, he would combine mega money Galactico recruitment with home-grown talent from La Fabrica (the Factory), Real’s academy. The poster boy for this strategy was Francisco Pavon, a young, local central defender who had been showing a degree of promise for some time. However, as the Galactico revolution spiralled out of control, the development of those younger players receded to the point where “Zidanes y Pavones” became just “Zidanes y más Zidanes”. After failing to live up to such unreasonable expectations, Pavon, along with the rest of his generation were eventually ushered out of the Bernebeau and left to forge a career in relative obscurity.

Although Perez’s strategy was inevitably seen to be a failure, the theory behind it may carry some merit. The class of 92 were integral to Manchester United’s treble winning side in 1999, La Masia heavily influenced each of Barcelona’s Champions winning teams during the last decade while Phillip Lahm, Bastian Schweinstiger, David Alaba and Thomas Muller all started (and won) the 2013 Champions League final having come through the ranks in Bravaria, while fellow graduates Holger Badstuber and Toni Kroos missed out through injury. Admittedly, all three generations were exceptional, a standard that is by no means common place, even at the biggest of clubs. However, a core of, often local, academy players are commonly an overt aspect of winning major titles. The fact that it took Madrid and their dream team philosophy, which only redoubled upon Perez’s return to office in 2009 with the stratospheric acquisitions of Ronaldo (Cristiano this time) and Kaka for a combined £145m, the better part of 15 years to claim La Decima, somewhat exemplifies this.

The presence of such a group adds something that expensive mid-career acquisitions usually cannot; an intrinsic understanding of what the team stands for, why it’s so important to the supporters and precisely what it would mean to win football’s greatest honours with that club, a club that has become theirs. They provide a heart and a soul, determination and desire synonymous with that felt in the stands, born out of pride for the city, it’s club and their fellow fans rather than the relatively hollow motivation money and the promise of prestige may otherwise generate. These players are not by definition local lads and may have been brought in during their early footballing development. David Beckham signing from Spurs in his teens, Leo Messi moving with his family from Newell’s at a teenager and Alaba joining Bayern from Austria Vienna at 16 are all prominent examples. Here the club has a chance to instil in them a specific footballing ideology, both tactically and thematically, while growing up in the area anchors the player emotionally to that club, that city and its supporters. It could be argued that some of Manchester City’s intermittent, flaky performances both at home and on the continent in recent years are a prime example of a lack of this passion, with perhaps only Joe Hart and Vincent Kompany harbouring genuine claims to a deep seated link to the club and even they were signed up relatively far into their careers.

PSG are perhaps even more detached. Since the Qatari take over, the Paris ‘project’ and it’s benefactors have been hell-bent on signing the world’s best players with the sole aim of taking Europe’s top prize, shelling out 40m for Javier Pastore, 55m for Edinson Cavani, 44m for Angel Di Maria, another 40 for David Luiz and for Zlatan’s ludicrous salary. Meanwhile the promising Kevin Gamerio was shipped off to Spain, Mamadou Sakho was given some nice flowers and sent off to Liverpool, Clement Chantome was marginalised and swiftly moved on to Bordeaux and Lucas Digne was farmed out to Roma. Not to mention Yohan Cabaye, who Ibra reportedly claimed to have never heard of upon his arrival and wasn’t given a real chance to establish himself in the first team before being sent back to England.

For the most part, these players were relatively recent signings too rather than academy products, more akin to Hart or Kompany. However their link to the league, the club and the country was far more potent than many that have been added to the squad as replacements and the chance was missed to begin to nurture the basis of that heart and soul Muller, Iniesta or the Nevilles provided their clubs. This more home-grown contingent could have then been used as a basis to introduce academy products who have a genuine chance of making the grade, maybe not as starters just yet but as prominent squad members, particularly in Ligue 1. Direct, pacey forward, Jean-Kevin Augustine (18), rangy centre-back Presenel Kimpembe (20) and excellent on loan (at Villereal) keeper Alphonse Areola (22), all very promising performers, could be used far more liberally along with Adrian Rabiot (20), the only prominent Parisian academy graduate in the PSG squad.

Granted, PSG needed to improve their squad if they were going to challenge at a higher level and, David Luiz aside, the development of their team has been a relative success. Nevertheless, a balance, one achieved by other clubs, could have been struck even if the older generation of players mentioned above may have not been wholly fit for purpose. Showing a degree of faith in home grown players would have at least narrowed the gap to begin with before the generation lead by Rabiot reached a stage where they could start taking heftier responsibilities. As it is, PSG are solely a team of excellent players brought to the club with the promise of money and trophies rather than because it is their team and their club, aside from Rabiot only Blaise Matuidi and Layvin Kurzawa are currently part of national boss, Didier Deschamps’, plans.

It has been said that, in recent times since the takeover, visiting the Parc de Prance has evolved into something akin to taking a seat at the opera. Fans arrive and quietly await a marvellous, cultured display. There is no comparison with the atmosphere at St. Etienne or Nantes or Marseille, it would seem a sizeable disconnect has developed between Paris and its team in a sporting sense. PSG feel as though they barely represent Paris or, in a broader sense, France to the degree by which clubs that they aspire to compete appear to in footballing terms. Although the heartfelt defiance and fierce patriotism displayed at the Parc following the November terror attacks proves that the club is still intrinsic to Parisian life in a more symbolic manner.

After three increasingly disappointing champions league exits, the pressure is on for Laurent Blanc and his side to progress in Europe this season. Although the ‘Zidanes y Pavones’ policy may have been poorly handled in Madrid, the shift in the balance away from Zlatans, toward more Rabiots may, in the long run, be a key factor in realising PSG’s obsession and bringing the European Cup back to France.